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INTRODUCTION 
Borrowing from its English forebears, the United States once had a 
form of punishment called civil death.  Civil death extinguished most 
civil rights of a person convicted of a crime and largely put that person 
outside the law’s protection.  Civil death as an institution faded away in 
the middle of the twentieth century.  Policymakers recognized that 
almost all convicted persons eventually rejoin society, and therefore, it 
was wise and fair to allow them to participate in society with some 
measure of equality. 
This Article proposes that civil death has surreptitiously reemerged.  
It no longer exists under that name, but effectually a new civil death is 
meted out to persons convicted of crimes in the form of a substantial 
and permanent change in legal status, operationalized by a network of 
collateral consequences.  A person convicted of a crime, whether mis-
demeanor or felony,1 may be subject to disenfranchisement2 (or de-
portation if a noncitizen3), criminal registration and community 
notification requirements,4 and the ineligibility to live, work, or be pre-
sent in a particular location.5  Some are not allowed to live outside of 
civil confinement at all.6  In addition, the person may be subject to 
occupational debarment7 or ineligibility to establish or maintain family 
relations.8  While the entire array of collateral consequences may not 
apply to any given person, the State is always able to add new disabil-
ities or to extend existing limitations.  As a practical matter, every 
criminal sentence contains the following unwritten term: 
The law regards you as having a “shattered character.”
9
  Therefore, in addi-
tion to any incarceration or fine, you are subject to legal restrictions and 
limitations on your civil rights, conduct, employment, residence, and rela-
tionships.  For the rest of your life, the United States and any State or local-
 
1 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra notes 30, 112 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 124, 129 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 120-21, 136 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 56-57, 117-18 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
9 Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 358 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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ity where you travel or reside may impose, at any time, additional re-
strictions and limitations they deem warranted.  Their power to do so is 
limited only by their reasonable discretion.  They may also require you to 
pay the expense of these restrictions and limitations. 
For many people convicted of crimes, the most severe and long-
lasting effect of conviction is not imprisonment or fine.  Rather, it is 
being subjected to collateral consequences involving the actual or 
potential loss of civil rights, parental rights, public benefits, and employ-
ment opportunities. 
The magnitude of the problem is greater than ever.  The commonly 
used term “mass incarceration” implies that the most typical tool of 
the criminal justice system is imprisonment.  Indeed, there are two 
million people in American prisons and jails, a huge number, but one 
which is dwarfed by the six-and-a-half million or so on probation or 
parole10 and the tens of millions in free society with criminal records.11  
The vast majority of people who have been convicted of crimes are not 
currently in prison.  However, because of their criminal records, they 
remain subject to governmental regulation of various aspects of their 
lives and concomitant imposition of benefits and burdens.  People 
convicted of crimes are not subject to just one collateral consequence, 
or even a handful.  Instead, hundreds and sometimes thousands of 
such consequences apply under federal and state constitutional provi-
sions, statutes, administrative regulations, and ordinances.12  As one 
Ohio court recognized in 1848, “[D]isabilities . . . imposed upon the 
convict” are “part of the punishment, and in many cases the most im-
portant part.”13 
As practically important as collateral consequences are, in a line of 
cases examining individual restrictions, the Court has held they are 
subject to extremely limited constitutional regulation.14  Because col-
lateral consequences are deemed to be something other than criminal 
sanctions, they can generally be applied without notice from the court 
or defense counsel at the time of a guilty plea.15  Moreover, new ones 
 
10 See infra note 83. 
11 See infra note 85. 
12 See Margaret Colgate Love, Essay, The Collateral Consequences of Padilla v. Ken-
tucky:  Is Forgiveness Now Constitutionally Required?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 113, 
116 n.12 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/12-2011/Love.pdf (listing inven-
tories of collateral consequences in particular jurisdictions). 
13 Sutton v. McIlhany, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 235, 236 (C.P. Huron County 1848). 
14 See infra Section I.D. 
15 See infra notes 146-48, 208 and accompanying text. 
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can be imposed retroactively after plea bargains have been made and 
sentences fully satisfied.16 
There is a little-noticed but significant countertradition.  In Weems 
v. United States17 and Trop v. Dulles,18 the Supreme Court found pun-
ishments cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment in part be-
cause of burdensome and systematic collateral consequences.19  In 
addition, alongside cases holding that particular collateral conse-
quences were not punishment, other Supreme Court decisions have 
shaped the right to jury trial, right to counsel, and other aspects of 
criminal procedure in light of the fact that collateral consequences are 
at stake in criminal judgments. 
The Court’s cases, then, simultaneously suggest that individual col-
lateral consequences are not punishment, but that systematic loss of 
legal status in the form of actual or potential subjection to an inter-
locking system of collateral consequences is punishment.  This para-
dox can be reconciled by understanding the degradation of a convict’s 
legal status to be a unitary punishment, the new civil death. 
Exclusively at issue in this Article are legal consequences imposed 
by state action, not social stigma or status in the sense of reputation or 
esteem.  To illustrate, that some may choose not to hire or marry a 
person with a criminal record is not a collateral consequence of con-
viction or a part of civil death as used here; however, legal prohibitions 
on hiring or marriage of convicted persons would be.20  In addition, 
the wisdom, fairness, efficiency, and justice of the new civil death are 
 
16 See infra notes 90-95, 136 and accompanying text. 
17 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
18 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
19 See infra notes 159-79 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(1), 5 
(2010) (defining the term “collateral consequence” and describing how judges should 
give notice of these consequences); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  COLLATERAL 
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS standard 
19-1.1 (2003) (“The term ‘collateral sanction’ means a legal penalty, disability or disad-
vantage, however denominated, that is imposed on a person automatically upon that 
person’s conviction for a felony, misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not includ-
ed in the sentence.”); Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts:  The Bare Rele-
vance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 968 (2010) (“The state thus 
bears responsibility for what it does and authorizes during the term of punish-
ment . . . . But the retributive punishment does not include whatever difficulties—
economic, physical, psychological—the offender may suffer after release from supervi-
sion of the criminal justice system . . . . When the state releases the offender and extin-
guishes any remaining conditions, it has said all it had to say.”). 
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important topics, but ones beyond the scope of this Article.21  Instead, 
the primary goal is to show that civil death both exists and is constitu-
tionally significant. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the historical 
punishment of civil death, its decline, and its revival in the form of a 
system of collateral consequences imposed by positive law based on 
criminal conviction.  Part I also describes the lenient judicial regula-
tion of these restrictions, which has generally found individual col-
lateral consequences to be “civil” and “regulatory” and thus not subject 
to constitutional limits applicable to criminal punishment. 
Part II proposes that civil death should be constitutionally cogni-
zable by showing that the systematic loss of legal status, subjecting an 
individual to numerous collateral consequences, has historically been 
treated as criminal punishment.  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
frequently recognized the role of criminal convictions in imposing 
collateral consequences and shaped criminal procedure to account 
for this reality. 
Part III proposes a reconciliation of the Court’s holdings, showing 
that while the Court has held that individual collateral consequences 
are not punishment, it has nevertheless held that systematic loss of 
legal status is.  It also describes some of the implications of under-
standing a civil death loss of legal status to be an inherent element of 
criminal, not civil, punishment, or at least that such a loss ought to be 
a subject of constitutional concern. 
I.  CIVIL DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Civil Death and Its Decline Before 1980 
At common law, there was an English and American22 institution of 
“civil death” as a punishment associated with conviction (or “attain-
 
21 Perhaps a good place to begin such an inquiry is to note the connections be-
tween race and status, conviction, and collateral consequences.  See, e.g., MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS 173-208 (2010) (arguing that collateral consequences disproportionately affect 
African Americans and resemble old Jim Crow laws); ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY 
AND SOCIAL DEATH 35-76 (1982) (examining slavery across cultures and arguing that a 
complex system of social exclusion, rather than race alone, drives slavery systems); 
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convic-
tion, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 262-64 (2002) (discussing the disproportionate 
effect of collateral consequences on African Americans in the context of drug crimes). 
22 See generally 13 CORPUS JURIS Convicts § 2 (1917) (“By the ancient common law 
when sentence was pronounced for treason or other felony the offender was . . . placed 
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der”) for treason or felony.23  As the New York Court of Appeals ex-
plained in 1888, under the English common law, a person sentenced 
for felony was 
placed in a state of attainder.  There were three principal incidents conse-
quent upon an attainder for treason or felony,—forfeiture, corruption of 
blood, and an extinction of civil rights, more or less complete, which was 
denominated civil death.  Forfeiture was a part of the punishment of the 
crime . . . by which the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the at-
tainted felon were forfeited to the king . . . . The blood of the attainted per-
son was deemed to be corrupt, so that neither could he transmit his estate to 
his heirs, nor could they take by descent from the ancestor . . . . The inci-
dent of civil death attended every attainder of treason or felony, whereby, 
in the language of Lord Coke, the attainted person “is disabled to bring 
any action, for he is extra legem positus, and is accounted in law civiliter mor-
tuus,” or, as stated by Chitty, “he is disqualified from being a witness, can 
bring no action, nor perform any legal function; he is in short regarded as 
dead in law.”
24
 
 
in a state of attainder.  And there were three principal incidents consequent on such 
attainder, namely, forfeiture, corruption of blood, and an extinction of civil rights, 
more or less complete, which was denominated civil death.” (footnotes omitted)); 
COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW IS A WHITE DOG:  HOW LEGAL RITUALS MAKE AND UNMAKE PER-
SONS 44-70 (2011) (discussing legal alienation in American history and how historic 
practices paved the way for contemporary developments); READINGS ON THE HISTORY 
AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 490-92 (Roscoe Pound & Theodore F.T. Plucknett 
eds., 3d ed. 1927) (citing additional sources); Rebecca McLennan, The Convict’s Two 
Lives:  Civil and Natural Death in the American Prison (exploring the development of civil 
death in American prisons in the nineteenth century and its relation to contemporary 
policy), in AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY:  BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT 191, 194-98, 208-12 
(David Garland et al. eds., 2011); Kim Lane Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpreta-
tion (examining the concept of civil death in the context of a case where a court re-
fused to allow a murderer to inherit from the decedent), in LAW AND THE ORDER OF 
CULTURE 42, 54-59 (Robert Post ed., 1991); Note, Civil Status of Convicts, 14 COLUM. L. 
REV. 592, 592-94 (1914) (analyzing various judicial interpretations of state civil death 
statutes); Note, The Legal Status of Convicts During and After Incarceration, 37 VA. L. REV. 
105, 105-10 (1951) (describing civil death jurisprudence under then-existing law); Case 
Comment, Persons:  The Status of Convicts, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 81, 82-83 (1916) (investigating 
the history and then-contemporary application of civil death in California). 
23 The opposite of “civil death” was not “criminal death.”  See Wageman v. Brown, 1 
Ohio Dec. Reprint 69, 72 (1844) (“The words natural death were used in contradistinc-
tion to the words ‘civil death.’”); see also Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 292, 325 (1845) 
(Catron, J., dissenting) (referring to “a natural or civil death”). 
24 Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (citations omitted) (quoting 3 ED-
WARD COKE, COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON *386 and 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW *725); see also, e.g., Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 210 
(1875) (describing forfeiture and corruption of blood under English common law); 
Rhea v. Rhenner, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 105, 108 (1828) (“It has been uniformly considered, 
that banishment, or abjuration, is a civil death of the husband.”); Rutherford’s Heirs v. 
Wolfe, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 272, 277 (1824) (noting the connection between attainder 
and civil death); State v. Duket, 63 N.W. 83, 85 (Wis. 1895) (“By the common law cer-
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Loss of status as a form of punishment also existed in other ancient 
legal regimes.25  
The consequences of attainder were on the minds of our Constitu-
tion’s drafters.  The Constitution provides, “The Congress shall have 
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of 
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during 
the Life of the Person attainted.”26  The delegates declined to adopt 
 
tain consequences resulted from judgment given in capital cases, namely, attainder, 
‘by which the defendant was no longer of any credit or reputation.  He cannot be a 
witness in any court, neither is he capable of performing the functions of another 
man; for, by anticipation of his punishment, he is already dead in law.’” (quoting 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380-81)).  But see Rankin’s Heirs v. Rankin’s 
Ex’rs, 22 Ky. (6 T.B. Mon.) 531, 537 (1828) (holding a man sentenced to death for 
murder still had the power to make a will). 
25 As the Second Circuit explained, 
[I]n ancient Athens, the penalty for certain crimes was placement in a state of 
“infamy,” which entailed the loss of those rights that enabled a citizen to partic-
ipate in public affairs, such as the rights to vote, to attend assemblies, to make 
speeches, and to hold public office.  The Roman Republic also employed infamy 
as a penalty for those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. 
The infamy practice in the ancient world over the years evolved into “civil 
death” laws in Medieval continental countries and into the “attainder” laws of 
Medieval England, which caused all family and political rights to be forfeited as 
additional punishment for crimes carrying sentences of death or life 
imprisonment. 
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing Mirjan R. Dam-
aska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal:  A Comparative Study, 59 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 351 (1968)).  The Supreme Court has also 
recognized this history.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448 (1965) 
(“The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punish-
ment . . . .” (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4. Wall.) 277, 320 (1866))); see 
also, e.g., 1 SAMUEL HALLIFAX, ELEMENTS OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW 110 (London, n. 
pub. 1818) (“Punishments of Natural or Civil Death were called Capital:  others, short 
of Natural or Civil Death, were called Not-Capital.”); The Russian Code (pt. III), 10 LE-
GAL OBSERVER 375, 377 (1835) (noting that in the nineteenth century Russian Code 
“[t]he punishments are those of death; political death; privation of civil rights; corporal 
punishment; hard labour; transportation; forced enlistment; fines; confiscations and 
ecclesiastical censures”). 
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.  Note that the word “attainder” as used in the Con-
stitution has the dual meaning of conviction and punishment.  A “Bill of Attainder” 
means conviction by the legislature.  See Communist Party v.  Subversive Activities Con-
trol Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86 (1961) (“The singling out of an individual for legislatively pre-
scribed punishment constitutes an attainder . . . .”); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 277, 323-24 (1866) (“The expression [bill of attainder] is generic, and includes 
not only legislative acts to punish felonies, but every legislative act which inflicts pun-
ishment without a judicial trial.”); Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 9 L. Ed. 709, 930 (1837) 
(Baldwin, J., concurring) (“Hence, the term bill of attainder, means the conviction of a 
person of a crime by legislative power . . . .”).  “Attainder” as used in the Treason Clause 
also refers to a specific set of punishments.  See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs, 433 U.S. 
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forfeiture and corruption of blood beyond a person’s lifetime.27  Civil 
death, though punishment, was not categorically prohibited. 
In England, civil death was a common law punishment, but in the 
United States, it existed only if authorized by statute.28  It was far from 
universal; only eighteen states employed it as of 1937,29 although states 
without a formal system of civil death restricted particular civil rights 
of convicted persons.30 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, civil death faced increasingly 
withering criticism.  In 1897, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a 
court of equity could not disregard an answer and enter default judg-
ment against a defendant who was in contempt on another issue.  As 
Justice White explained for the Court, “[I]f such power obtained, then 
the ancient common law doctrine of ‘outlawry,’ and that of the conti-
nental systems as to ‘civil death,’ would be a part of the chancery law, a 
theory which could not be admitted without violating the rudimentary 
conceptions of the fundamental rights of the citizen.”31  The Illinois 
Supreme Court in 1907 quoted approvingly a scholar’s conclusion that 
it “raises a feeling of repulsion, whether the incapacity is presented 
singly or as a consequent of another punishment.  It is a barbarism 
condemned by justice, by reason and by morality.”32  A German com-
mentator wrote in 1916:   
 
425, 473 & n.35 (1977) (explaining that “a bill of attainder originally connoted a par-
liamentary Act sentencing [someone] to death” and that “attainder of death was usually 
accompanied by a forfeiture of the condemned person’s property . . . and the corrup-
tion of his blood, whereby his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate”); Fur-
man v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 317 n.8 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
English also provided for attainder (‘dead in law’) as the immediate and inseparable 
concomitant of the death sentence.  The consequences of attainder were forfeiture of 
real and personal estates and corruption of blood.”). 
27 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613 (1993) (“The Constitution forbids 
forfeiture of estate as a punishment for treason ‘except during the Life of the Person 
attainted,’ and the First Congress also abolished forfeiture of estate as a punishment for 
felons.” (citations omitted)). 
28 See, e.g., Frazer v. Fulcher, 17 Ohio 260, 262-64 (1848) (rejecting the English 
common law punishment and distinguishing the tradition of civil punishment in New 
York because there it was enacted by statute); Note, Civil Death Statutes—Medieval Fiction 
in a Modern World, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968, 968 n.1 (1937) (listing civil death statutes from 
eighteen states). 
29 Note, supra note 28, at 968 n.1. 
30 See ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 17 (2006) 
(noting that many states imposed felon disenfranchisement even if they did not impose 
civil death). 
31 Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 444 (1897). 
32 Collins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 83 N.E. 542, 545 (Ill. 1907) (quoting 1 FRANCIS 
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107, at 252 note (3d. 1905)). 
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 The recognition of the legal rights of the individual follows naturally 
upon the conception of the free personality.  Hence it comes that the pen-
alty of so-called civil death pronounced upon a living man is not consonant 
with our conception of justice.  Therefore this punishment has been done 
away with nearly everywhere and is not likely to recur.
33
 
Perhaps the decline of civil death can be traced to the new reality 
that conviction of a felony no longer necessarily implied a capital sen-
tence.  When all felonies were punishable by death—and such sen-
tences were regularly and speedily carried out—it made some sense to 
begin to settle the convicted person’s affairs as soon as the sentence 
became final.34  Civil death in its original application was thus a transi-
tional status in the period between a capital sentence and its execu-
tion, not a condition applicable potentially for decades.  Blackstone 
reported, for example, that a benefit of clergy, which prevented execu-
tion for a capital felony, also “restored [the convicted person] to all 
capacities and credits, and the possession of his lands, as if he had 
never been convicted.”35 
The developing principle of sentencing proportionality reduced 
the number of executions, which raised doubts about the wisdom and 
utility of civil death.  As a Harvard Law Review Note argued in 1937, “It 
is the volume of parole and pardon figures that gives the vestigial doc-
trine of civil death a new significance, warranting an examination of 
the conflicts and inconsistencies into which it has led courts and legis-
latures.”36  Civil death contradicted the idea that offenders could pay 
their debt to society and the reality that the prison experience, for 
many, would be a temporary if significant interruption to their lives. 
As Margaret Colgate Love has written, mainstream legal opinion 
began to recognize the problem of excessive collateral consequences 
in the 1950s.37  The 1956 National Conference on Parole, a joint effort 
 
33 1 HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE, POLITICS 161-62 (Blanche Dugdale & Torben de 
Bille trans., 1916). 
34 Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights:  Congress and the Supreme 
Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1238 n.31 (1998) (“Civil death statutes applied to 
prisoners facing a capital sentence (a larger proportion of convicted felons at common 
law than under current laws) to help the death row prisoner’s family settle property 
matters immediately.”); Harry David Saunders, Civil Death:  A New look at an Ancient 
Doctrine, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 988, 990 (1970) (“[C]ivil death was a practical way of 
settling the earthly affairs of a convicted felon soon to be executed.”). 
35 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *374. 
36 Note, supra note 28, at 970-71. 
37 See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate:  In Praise of a For-
gotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1707-17 (2003) (dis-
cussing reformers’ efforts to limit collateral consequences).   
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of the U.S. Attorney General, the U.S. Board of Parole, and the Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency, called loss of civil rights “an 
archaic holdover from early times” meriting abolition.38  In 1983, the 
American Bar Association “confidently predicted that collateral sanc-
tions were on their way to extinction:  ‘As the number of disabilities 
diminishes and their imposition becomes more rationally based and 
restricted in coverage, the need for expungement and nullification 
statutes decreases.’”39  By 1984, a House committee had claimed the 
existence of a “consensus that arbitrary restrictions on the rights of 
former offenders should be eliminated.”40  In the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, many civil death statutes were repealed or wholly or partially 
voided.41  However, civil death never fully disappeared.  New York,42 
the Virgin Islands,43 and Rhode Island44 retain forms of it for persons 
sentenced to life imprisonment, and Idaho retains a version of it for all 
prisoners,45 but textually and by court decision, these statutes leave 
convicted persons in possession of some rights.46 
 
38 Id. at 1708 (quoting NAT’L PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND 
PRACTICE 136 (1957)). 
39 Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society:  Forgiveness, Redemption, and 
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 768 (2011) (cit-
ing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS standard 23-8.2 
cmt. (1985)). 
40 Id. at 767 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 134 (1984)). 
41 See generally 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 16:2, at 482-88 (4th ed. 
2009) (listing state civil death statutes and the repeal or invalidation of most of them). 
42 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-a(1) (McKinney 2009) (“[A] person sentenced to 
imprisonment for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead.”).  New York’s first civil 
death statute was passed on March 29, 1799.  Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118, 
120 (N.Y. Ch. 1822). 
43 See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 92 (1996) (“Whoever is sentenced to imprisonment 
for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead.”). 
44 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (2002) (declaring that a life prisoner is “deemed to 
be dead in all respects, as if his or her natural death had taken place at the time of 
conviction”). 
45 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310(1) (2004) (“A sentence of custody to the Idaho 
state board of correction suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced . . . .”).  
Rights are restored upon discharge from prison, probation and parole.  Id. § 18-310(2). 
46 See, e.g., id. § 18-310(1) (preserving right to sue); N.Y. CIV. RTS. LAW § 79-a(2) 
(same); id. § 79-c (“Nothing in sections seventy-nine or seventy-nine-a of this chapter 
shall be deemed to deny a convict sentenced to imprisonment the right to injunctive 
relief for improper treatment where such treatment constitutes a violation of his consti-
tutional rights.”); see also infra note 64. 
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B.  The New Civil Death in the Regulatory State 
Even as civil death as an institution bearing that name withered, it 
was replaced with a new version—a pervasive system of collateral con-
sequences applicable to people convicted of crimes.  Historically, such 
a judgment meant that the person was dead in the eyes of the law; 
now, the judgment means that the person has a “shattered char-
acter.”47  This is not merely a moral observation.  It gives rise to a legal 
status making convicted persons subject to restrictions on freedom, 
benefits, and rights.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“[a] felon customarily suffers the loss of substantial rights.”48  However, 
these effects are not limited to those with felony convictions, as “[a] 
wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor convic-
tions.”49  Every conviction implies a permanent change, because these 
disabilities will “carry through life.”50  For citizens, a prominent collat-
 
47 Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 358 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
48 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946); see also Daniels v. United States, 
532 U.S. 374, 379 (2001) (“States impose a wide range of disabilities on those who have 
been convicted of crimes, even after their release.”); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 
69 n.8 (1970) (“Both the convicted felon and the convicted misdemeanant may be 
prevented under New York law from engaging in a wide variety of occupations.  In ad-
dition, the convicted felon is deprived of certain civil rights, including the right to vote 
and to hold public office.”). 
49 See Argersinger v.  Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(listing such civil disabilities as “forfeiture of public office, disqualification from a li-
censed profession, and loss of pension rights” (citations omitted)); see also Hopper v. 
State, 957 N.E.2d 613, 625 (Ind. 2011) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (“Uncounseled pro se 
defendants may very well plead guilty even to certain misdemeanor offenses that carry 
devastating collateral consequences ranging from deportation, to eviction from public 
housing, to barriers in employment.”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:  Defin-
ing Effective Advocacy in the Lower Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297-303 (2011) (re-
viewing a list of possible collateral consequences of misdemeanors, including 
deportation for noncitizens, sex-offender registration, and eviction from public hous-
ing).  Misdemeanor convictions can also lead to sex offender registration, e.g., United 
States v. Ross, 778 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2011), or deportation, e.g., Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580-81 (2010).  Disenfranchisement is also im-
posed on people with misdemeanor convictions under the law of some states.  See, e.g., 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-120(B)(2)–(3) (Supp. 2008); Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 788 
(Ind. 2011); see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76 n.24 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Even a jaywalking or traffic conviction could conceivably lead to disen-
franchisement, since § 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] does not differentiate be-
tween felonies and misdemeanors.”); Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 177 n.18 (D. 
Mass. 2004) (“The Court does not use the term ‘felon,’ often used in discussing the disen-
franchisement problem, because it is in fact possible to lose the vote for conviction of 
misdemeanors . . . .”). 
50 Fiswick v.  United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946); see also, e.g., Chaunt, 364 U.S. 
at 356 (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that a federal felony conviction “strips an offender 
of all civil rights and leaves a shattered character that only a presidential pardon can 
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eral consequence is the loss of civil rights51:  “A convicted criminal may 
be disenfranchised, lose the right to hold federal or state office, be 
barred from entering certain professions, be subject to impeachment 
when testifying as a witness, be disqualified from serving as a juror, and 
may be subject to divorce.”52  To this ever-increasing list may be added 
the loss of the right to keep and bear arms.53  For noncitizens, convic-
tion may result in deportation.54 
The effects of the loss of status are particularly profound given the 
many areas of life now subject to governmental regulation.  Conviction 
potentially affects many aspects of family relations, including, for ex-
ample, the ability to adopt, be a foster parent, or retain custody of 
one’s own children.55  Conviction can make one ineligible for public 
employment, such as in the military and law enforcement.56  It can pre-
clude private employment, including working in regulated industries,57 
with government contractors,58 or in fields requiring a security clearance. 
 
mend”); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Con-
viction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable 
to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects 
his reputation and economic opportunities.”), overruled by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 
U.S. 234 (1968). 
51 See LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON:  ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf 
(discussing the legal barriers facing individuals following a criminal conviction).  But see 
Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 318 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the possibility that “an ex-felon’s . . . civil rights, such as the right to vote, the right to 
seek and to hold public office, and the right to serve on a jury, [might be] restored.  In 
restoring those rights, the State has presumably deemed such ex-felons worthy of par-
ticipating in civic life.” (citation omitted)). 
52 North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 n.1 (1971) (citations omitted). 
53 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (recognizing a fun-
damental Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, but noting that “nothing in 
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons”). 
54 See Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, 
while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment.”). 
55 See McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”:  The Seismic Evolution of Padilla 
v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 825 (2011) 
(“Certain charges and convictions result in the loss of custody of a child or irrevocable 
termination of parental rights.”). 
56 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006) (restricting enlistment of people with convic-
tions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.13(4) (West Supp. 2009) (prohibiting employment as law 
enforcement officers of those convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors). 
57 For example, the court in DiCola v. FDA upheld a lifetime debarment from the 
pharmaceutical industry based on a criminal conviction: 
The permanence of the debarment can be understood, without reference to 
punitive intent, as reflecting a congressional judgment that the integrity of the 
drug industry, and with it public confidence in that industry, will suffer if those 
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Conviction can also restrict one’s ability to hold a government con-
tract, to obtain government licenses and permits, or to collect a vested 
public pension.59  Those convicted of certain crimes may lose the right 
to drive a car.60  Persons convicted of sex offenses usually have to regis-
ter, may be excluded from living in particular areas, and are even sub-
ject to post-incarceration civil confinement.61 
Again, the phenomenon addressed here is the myriad legal conse-
quences of conviction imposed by law.  There is a general problem of 
reentry of released prisoners and reintegration of anyone with a crim-
inal record.62  Having a criminal history generates a range of social 
effects, most prominently including employment discrimination and 
other forms of market discrimination.  Conviction may result in psy-
chological effects and impair future employability because of forced 
removal from the labor market.  As important and problematic as these 
limitations are, they are not directly at issue here.  Here, the focus is 
on penalties imposed by positive law, by or at the command of the 
government itself.63 
There are differences between traditional civil death and its mod-
ern form.  Today, a convicted person does not lose her right to sue, 
one of the features of historical common law and statutory civil 
 
who manufacture drugs use the services of someone who has committed a fel-
ony subversive of FDA regulation.  That judgment may proceed from a skepti-
cal view of the malleability of individual men and women; or from a greater 
concern with the cost of an error visited upon the public than with the cost of 
an error felt only by the excluded felon; or more likely from the cumulative 
force of both sentiments. 
77 F.3d 504, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
58 For example, 46 U.S.C. § 70105 prohibits people with certain convictions from ob-
taining a federal identification card allowing access to secure transportation areas.  Fail-
ure to obtain a card could preclude employment necessitating entry into such an area. 
59 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2010) 
(holding that counsel must “warn his client of the loss of pension as a consequence to 
pleading guilty”), appeal granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010). 
60 See 23 U.S.C. § 159 (requiring states to suspend driver’s licenses of people con-
victed of drug crimes or else lose significant federal highway funds). 
61 See infra notes 120-21, 136. 
62 See, e.g., CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (Christopher Mele & Theresa 
A. Miller eds., 2005); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:  THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); JEREMY TRAVIS, 
BUT THEY ALL COME BACK:  FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005); 
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Confronting Issues of Race 
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010). 
63 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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death.64  The new civil death is also not as harsh as expatriation, in that 
a modern citizen subject to civil death nevertheless remains a citizen 
and therefore may continue to reside in the United States.65 
On the other hand, modern civil death is harsher and more severe 
in several important ways.  First, extinction of equal legal status affects 
a wider range of interests than it did in past decades.  In England and 
even in early to mid-twentieth century America, there were fewer pub-
lic benefits to lose.66  In addition, there were then many fewer busi-
nesses and professions for which one did not need a license, a permit, 
or the ability to obtain a government contract.67  Now, for a person 
who must work for a living, loss of the right to do business with the 
government—or work in any regulated industry—could result in exclu-
sion as complete as civil death under the nineteenth-century statutes. 
The disabilities are also stickier.  While the new civil death, like the 
old, can be mitigated through pardon and other forms of legal relief,68 
pardon was a much more realistic hope for convicted persons in the 
past than it is now.69  Moreover, while historically the disabilities of civil 
 
64 See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that a conviction does not strip a prisoner of her right to proceed in federal court 
in forma pauperis); Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 882 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (“[A] 
state statute, which . . . deprives all state inmates of the right to file any type of civil 
action in state court contravenes the constitutional imperative that citizens are entitled 
to reasonable access to courts.”); Sabin v. Butter, 493 So. 2d 469, 469-70 (Fla. App. 
1986) (holding that a state law limiting access to state court was unconstitutional).  But 
see Joan Dayan, Held in the Body of the State:  Prisons and the Law (suggesting that elimina-
tion of prison law libraries effectively eliminated prisoners’ right to sue), in HISTORY, 
MEMORY, AND THE LAW 183, 244-47 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999). 
65 For example, Afroyim v. Rusk held that a citizen cannot be deprived of citizenship 
status involuntarily.  387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).  However, this difference may not be 
significant to the extent that people with convictions remain subject to residential re-
strictions and post-release civil incarceration.  See infra notes 121, 133, 136. 
66 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734-37 (1964). 
67 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (“Society today is built 
around entitlement . . . . Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow 
from government . . . .” (alteration omitted) (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual 
Rights and Social Welfare:  The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965))). 
68 See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
A CRIMINAL CONVICTION:  A STATE BY STATE RESOURCE GUIDE (2006) (“Pardon is 
assigned a central role in overcoming the legal barriers to reintegration of criminal 
offenders in almost every U.S. jurisdiction[]; indeed, in most jurisdictions it is the only 
mechanism by which adult felony offenders can avoid or mitigate collateral penalties 
and disabilities.”). 
69 See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1181-82 (2010) (“[I]n most years between 1900 and 1936, more 
than half of the thousands of petitions filed were sent forward to the White House with 
a favorable official recommendation.  At the White House, the president usually ap-
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death generally applied only in the state of conviction,70 now a convic-
tion in one jurisdiction generally has effects across the entire country.71  
Often one jurisdiction will impose a disability without regard to 
whether the jurisdiction of conviction does so.72  In both of these ways, 
the new civil death is more difficult to escape than the old. 
C.  Mass Conviction, Not ( Just) Mass Incarceration 
The new civil death is of great practical importance because of the 
rise of mass conviction.  Many distinguished scholars have used a dif-
ferent term to describe this phenomenon:  “mass incarceration.”73  
They observe that since 1970, and even more profoundly since 1980, 
there has been an increase in both the rate of imprisonment and the 
absolute number of people in prison.  That increase has been called 
 
proved cases recommended favorably . . . and sometimes was more inclined to leniency.” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1192 (noting that during the administrations of Presidents 
Kennedy through Carter, pardon grant rates ranged from thirty to forty percent); see 
also LOVE, supra note 68, at 18-38 (discussing pardon practices in the states). 
70 See Huntington v.  Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892) (“And personal disabilities 
imposed by the law of a State, as an incident or consequence of a judicial sentence or 
decree, by way of punishment of an offender, and not for the benefit of any other per-
son . . . are doubtless strictly penal, and therefore have no extra-territorial operation.”). 
71 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1)(e) (West Supp. 2009) (denying firearms to 
those convicted in other states). 
72 In Logan v. United States, for example, a defendant with three state battery convic-
tions was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law, despite the fact that 
the law in his state of conviction imposed no such prohibition.  552 U.S. 23, 26 (2007); 
see also, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1 (Supp. 2007) (defining “sexual offense” to in-
clude “any federal, military, or out-of-state conviction for any offense that under the 
laws of this State would be a sexual offense”); Jeffrey B. Kuck, Annotation, Elections:  
Effect of Conviction Under Federal Law, or Law of Another State or Country, on Right to Vote or 
Hold Public Office, 39 A.L.R.3d 303, 313-14 (1971) (discussing cases holding that under 
the law of one state, conviction in another state can trigger disenfranchisement). 
73 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 21; TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES:  
HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); 
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS:  THE POLITICS OF MASS INCAR-
CERATION IN AMERICA (2006); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED:  RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING 
WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007); MARY PATTILLO ET AL., IMPRISONING 
AMERICA:  THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (2004); Ian F. Haney López, 
Post-Racial Racism:  Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the 
Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477 (2009); Dorothy E. Roberts, 
The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 1271 (2004); Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions:  Housing, Homicide, and 
Mass Incarceration since 1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 165; Anthony C. Thompson, Unlock-
ing Democracy:  Examining the Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration on Black Political 
Power, 54 HOW. L.J. 587 (2011); James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010) (book review). 
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“unprecedented in the history of liberal democracy.”74  In 1980, more 
than 500,000 Americans were confined to prisons and jails; today there 
are nearly two million.75 
Yet, focusing exclusively on “mass incarceration”76 obscures the re-
ality that most convicted persons are not sentenced to prison.  There 
are approximately 1.1 million new state felony convictions in a typical 
year,77 and some multiple of that in misdemeanor convictions.78  In 
addition, there are approximately 80,000 federal convictions each 
 
74 Jude McCulloch & Phil Scraton, Introduction to THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 
1, 14 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009). 
75 LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1 tbl.1 (2011), available at http:// 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus10.pdf; PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf; see also ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL 
K. GILLIARD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 151654, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 2 
(1995), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf. 
76 While this Section proposes that the phrase “mass incarceration” does not cap-
ture the full impact of collateral consequences, this observation is not meant to imply 
that scholars using the phrase are unaware of the collateral consequences of criminal 
conviction, or have not paid enough attention to them in their scholarship.  The obser-
vation is about the limits of the term, not about the work of those who use it. 
77 E.g., SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 226846, 
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. 
78 Systematic misdemeanor statistics are not readily available, but it is clear that 
misdemeanor convictions are more common than felony convictions.  See KAMALA D. 
HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2010, at 16 (2011), available at 
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd10/preface.pdf (reporting nearly 1.4 
million arrests in California in 2010, of which 448,552 were for felonies and the re-
mainder for misdemeanors or status offenses); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMIN-
ING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 
(2010), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/csp/2008_files/EWSC-2008-
Online%20Version%20v2.pdf (reporting that misdemeanors comprised seventy-nine 
percent of the criminal caseload in a 2008 study of eleven state courts); LYNN LANGTON 
& DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 228538, PUBLIC DEFEND-
ER OFFICES, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 12 tbl.5a (2010), available at http:// 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf (reporting that public defenders sur-
veyed were assigned a total of 378,400 felony and 575,770 misdemeanor cases in 2007); 
2006–2010 Disposition of Adult Arrests, N.Y. ST. DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, 
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2012) (reporting that in 2010, there were 546,416 adult arrests, leading to 35,597 
felony convictions, and 286,131 convictions for misdemeanors or lesser offenses); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manu-
script at 9 & n.25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2010826 (estimating 10.5 
million nontraffic misdemeanors annually (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE:  THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURT 11 (2009))). 
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year, most of which are felonies.79  Most defendants convicted of felo-
nies are not sentenced to state prison—about sixty percent receive 
probation only or probation with local jail time.80  Even more defend-
ants convicted of misdemeanors avoid incarceration altogether.81  
While many are sentenced to prison, and even though sentence length 
has increased in recent decades, the average term is now less than five 
years.82  Accordingly, it is likely that the vast majority even of those sen-
tenced to prison will spend most of their lives in free society. 
Those convicted but not incarcerated are typically sentenced to 
probation.  Six-and-a-half million people were on probation at some 
point during 2009,83 three times the number in prison or jail.84  At the 
broadest level of generality, approximately sixty-five million adults 
have a criminal record of some kind, although some of those involve 
arrests not leading to conviction.85  Accordingly, the size of the of-
fender population is not just the two million in custody; it also in-
cludes the more than six million in the control of the criminal justice 
system who are not in custody plus the tens of millions who have a 
record but are not in prison or jail or on probation or parole. 
The “incarceration” part of mass incarceration implies that actual 
confinement is the most important feature of the system.  However, as 
legally and socially significant as a term in prison is, for most people 
convicted of crimes, collateral consequences will generate the most 
 
79 See Federal Justice Statistics, 2008—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUST. STAT. tbl.5.1 (Nov. 
2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/tables/fjs08st501.pdf (re-
porting 82,823 federal convictions in the year ending September 30, 2008, of which 
75,832 were felonies). 
80 ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 77, at 4 tbl.1.2. 
81 See, e.g., 2006–2010 Disposition of Adult Arrests, supra note 78, at 5 (reporting 
that between 2006 and 2010, between 18% and 19.8% of those arrested for misde-
meanors were sentenced to prison or jail, while another 0.9% to 1% were sentenced 
to jail plus probation). 
82 State prison sentences averaged fifty-nine months.  ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra 
note 77, at 6 tbl.1.3.  Federal sentences averaged just over five years. Federal Justice Statis-
tics, 2008—Statistical Tables, supra note 79, tbl.5.2. 
83 LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 
231674, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 3 tbl.2 (2010), availa-
ble at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus09.pdf. 
84 Id.; see also GLAZE, supra note 75, at 3. 
85 MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PRO-
JECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”:  THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACK-
GROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 27 n.2 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/ 
page/-/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf; see also Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Preva-
lence of Arrest From Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012) (report-
ing the results of a study showing that 30% of surveyed twenty-three-year-olds had been 
arrested, compared to 22% that had been arrested in a similar 1965 study). 
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significant effects.  Merely escaping incarceration hardly means that a 
person with a conviction is not subject to other legal consequences as a 
result of her conviction.86  Criminal records are increasingly available 
to all branches of the government and all segments of the public 
through computer databases, thus making collateral consequences 
more susceptible to ready enforcement.87 
Loss of legal status is more important, ironically, for relatively less 
serious crimes.  If a person is sentenced to twenty-five years impris-
onment at hard labor, it likely matters little that she will be ineligible 
to get a license as a chiropractor when she is released.  But to a per-
son sentenced to unsupervised probation and a $250 fine for a minor 
offense, losing her city job or being unable to teach, care for the el-
derly, live in public housing, or be a foster parent to a relative can be 
disastrous.  “[I]n many cases the most important part” of the con-
viction,88 in terms of both social policy and the legal effect, lies in the 
collateral consequences. 
D.  Collateral Consequences as Unrestrained by the Constitution 
Courts have imposed few limits on creation and implementation of 
collateral consequences.  They are generally regarded as nonpunitive.  
 
86 See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT:  FELON DISENFRANCHISE-
MENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 70 (2006) (“While some felons go to prison . . . many 
others serve time in jail or on probation in their communities. . . . [A]t least some states 
disenfranchise misdemeanants as well.”); see also, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing 
Internal Exile:  The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 153, 154 (1999) (“Despite their innocuous name, for many convicted offend-
ers, and especially those who never serve any prison time, these ‘collateral’ conse-
quences ‘are . . . the most persistent punishments that are inflicted for [their] crime.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Velmer S. Burton, Jr. et al., The Collateral Consequences 
of a Felony Conviction:  A National Study of State Statutes, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1987, at 
52)); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”:  The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement 
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (noting that of the forty-eight 
states and the District of Columba with disenfranchisement policies, only seventeen 
limit disenfracement to periods of incarceration); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchise-
ment as Punishment:  Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1898 
(1999) (criticizing criminal disenfranchisement “as a technique for reinforcing the 
branding of felons as the untouchable class of American society”). 
87 See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.  POL’Y 177, 179-80 (2007) (“[A]dvances in 
information technology have made . . . criminal records systems more comprehensive, 
efficient, and easier to use.”). 
88 Sutton v. McIlhany, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 235, 236 (C.P. Huron County 1848); see 
also Love, supra note 12 at 114 (“While conventionally labeled as civil, collateral conse-
quences are increasingly understood and experienced as criminal punishment, and 
never-ending punishment at that.”). 
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Accordingly, they are not evaluated for overall proportionality,89 nor is 
there significant scrutiny for reasonableness.  In addition, existing col-
lateral consequences may be imposed without warning, and new ones 
may be created and imposed after a sentence has been fully served. 
1.  Individual Collateral Consequences 
as Regulatory Measures 
The modern law of collateral consequences seems to have begun 
with Hawker v. New York.90  Hawker, a physician, was convicted of per-
forming an abortion, a felony at the time.91  The New York legislature 
later passed a law prohibiting those convicted of a felony from being 
licensed to practice medicine.92  The Supreme Court upheld the pro-
hibition by a vote of six to three, with Justice Harlan writing for the 
dissenting Justices. 
The majority concluded that the disqualification was not truly 
based on the conviction; the conviction was mere evidence.93  The dis-
ability was instead based on violating the law, which made Hawker inel-
igible because he had a bad moral character.  The law was not ex post 
facto, because the disability was based on the illegal conduct of which 
the conviction is mere evidence.94  Anyone proved to have performed 
abortions would be similarly ineligible.95 
Another leading (and problematic) decision, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, establishes a test for determining whether a law is criminal 
punishment or civil regulation.96  The test employs seven97 nonexclu-
sive,98 unweighted factors, filtered through a rule that only the “clear-
est proof” will overcome a legislative claim that a measure is civil.99  
 
89 See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1684-89 
(2009) (discussing a lack of proportionality in immigration law as compared to crimi-
nal punishments). 
90 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
91 Id. at 189. 
92 Id. at 190. 
93 Id. at 195. 
94 Id. at 197-98. 
95 For an extended discussion of this case, see Gabriel J. Chin, Are Collateral Sanc-
tions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?:  The Case of Abortion Doctors, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1685 (2003). 
96 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
97 See id. at 168-69 (listing the seven factors). 
98 See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (holding that the factors may 
overlap, and that not all need be present in every case). 
99 E.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 (2001). 
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Examination of the purposes of the legislature generally does not ex-
tend beyond the text of the law itself.100  Of course, the outcome of any 
seven-factor, nonexclusive test is indeterminate, and the key cases have 
been decided by very close votes.  Mendoza-Martinez itself invalidated, 
by a five-to-four vote, automatic expatriation of those who avoided war-
time military service by leaving the United States.101 
The result is that a State may subject convicted persons to harsh 
treatment.  While it is unconstitutional if the State acts in such a fash-
ion for “punitive” purposes, that treatment is entirely permissible if the 
underlying reason is to protect public safety or to promote some other 
aspect of the public interest.  But virtually no examination of the actual 
motivation of the legislature is permitted by the judiciary.  Obviously, a 
test putting so much weight on formal categorization will uphold many 
measures that are in fact motivated by a desire to punish.102 
United States v. Brown held that a law criminalizing service by a 
Communist in union offices was an unconstitutional bill of attainder,103 
which necessarily required a finding that the law constituted punish-
ment.  The opinion offered a compelling argument that the quest for 
a sharp difference between punitive and regulatory measures is futile; 
punishment, including imprisonment and capital punishment itself, is 
often imposed for preventative purposes.104  One must, therefore, ques-
tion the wisdom of a rule relying so much on a distinction between 
regulation and punishment, when the two are often not different in 
 
100 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997). 
101 372 U.S. at 186. 
102 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punish-
ment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1282 (1998) (“The Mendoza-Martinez factors over the 
years have been applied in a highly selective and ultimately inconsistent manner.”); 
Paul W. Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 
109 (1954) (“The deprivation of ‘civil rights’ may be conceived to be either an auxiliary 
punishment in itself or the incidental consequence of conviction and sentence, not 
intended to be specifically punitive but merely protective of public interests and of 
official convenience.  Such a distinction as this appears unimportant to the offender:  
he may well consider these losses to be a part of the vindictive punishments that society 
exacts.  And, in fact, they do appear very frequently to reflect retributive sentiments 
rather than any real need for community protection.”). 
103 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965). 
104 See id. at 458 (“It would be archaic to limit the definition of ‘punishment’ to 
‘retribution.’  Punishment serves several purposes:  retributive, rehabilitative, deter-
rent—and preventive.  One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes 
is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any 
the less punishment.”); see also, e.g., Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral 
and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 708-09 (2008) (arguing that involuntary commitment of 
“sexually violent predators” is punishment because it is “quite similar to incarceration”). 
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principle.105  More recently, Justice Stevens persuasively argued that 
the search for legislative intent behind sex offender registration laws 
was beside the point:  “In my opinion, a sanction that (1) is imposed 
on everyone who commits a criminal offense, (2) is not imposed on 
anyone else, and (3) severely impairs a person’s liberty is punish-
ment.”106  Whatever the merits of these more searching tests for pun-
ishment, they are not the law today. 
Even if they do not rise to the level of “punishment,” restrictions on 
people with convictions must nevertheless be rational under the Equal 
Protection Clause.107  However, rational basis review performed by 
courts in this context is far from exacting.108  For example, courts have 
found denials of public benefits to people with convictions to be “ra-
tional” because such restrictions save taxpayer money.109  In addition, 
 
105 See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping 
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 494 (2009) (“In an advanced regulatory pyra-
mid . . . self-regulation constitutes the base of the pyramid with escalated forms of en-
forcement—command regulation and punishment—at the top.”); Max Minzner, Why 
Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 857 (2012) (arguing that “retribution is an 
important and, in most cases, the dominant motivation” for “civil” regulatory sanc-
tions); see also Dan Markel et al., Beyond Experience:  Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 605, 620-21 (2011) (arguing that some collateral consequences are pun-
ishment because with them “the state may . . . be continuing its message of condemna-
tion”).  See generally BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION (1980); 
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
106 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107 See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 430 (1974) (upholding the exclusion 
from a rehabilitation program of persons with more than one felony conviction).  See 
generally Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class:  Towards a Constitutional Frame-
work for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 
18, 27-51 (2005) (analyzing case law on criminal record-based occupational restrictions). 
108 For example, it is not necessarily unconstitutional to treat license holders with 
convictions differently from applicants.  Compare Heller v. Ross, 682 F. Supp. 2d 797, 
807 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding differential treatment of applicants and license-
holders convicted of felonies), with Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(per curiam) (invalidating differential treatment), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 434 
U.S. 356 (1978). 
109 See Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[C]onservation 
of funds constitutes a rational basis on which to deny assistance to convicted felons and 
sex offenders.”); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 424-25 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that denial of food stamp program benefits to convicted persons does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause); Hall v. West, No. 99-7070, 1999 WL 1072252, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 
Nov. 17, 1999) (per curiam) (upholding denial of veterans’ benefits to those in pris-
on); Peeler v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 649, 651-52 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding the denial of 
Social Security disability benefits to an inmate against an ex post facto challenge be-
cause “there is a rational connection between [the denial] and the nonpunitive goal of 
regulating the distribution of disability benefits”); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 
753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (upholding the restriction on educational aid to people with 
felony convictions and explaining that “[t]he felon classification bears a rational 
G Chin FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/11/2012 3:03 PM 
1810 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1789 
courts do not require legislatures or agencies to classify people with 
convictions precisely.110 
The Supreme Court has found denial or burdening the exercise of 
civil rights to be unobjectionable in many circumstances, including 
deportation for noncitizens111 and deprivation of a citizen’s right to 
vote,112 hold public office,113 serve on a jury,114 testify,115 and possess 
firearms.116  It has approved prohibitions on occupational licenses,117 
and on private employment where there is a public interest.118  It has 
upheld denial of public benefits,119 and special restrictions, such as reg-
istration120 and incarceration121 of sex offenders. 
At some point, the Constitution limits the power of legislatures.122  
The Court has held that prisoners serving less than life sentences can-
 
relationship to the legitimate state purpose of assuring that only responsible citizens 
receive state aid”). 
110 See, e.g., Carbonaro, 392 F. Supp. at 759-60 (rejecting the claim that classification 
was unconstitutionally under- or overinclusive). 
111 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1954). 
112 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974). 
113 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 n.8 (1970) (noting that in New York, 
“the convicted felon is deprived of certain civil rights, including the right . . . to hold 
public office”); see also Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 318 (1998) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the possibility that “an ex-felon’s . . . civil rights, such as the 
right to vote, the right to seek and to hold public office, and the right to serve on a 
jury, [might be] restored.  In restoring those rights, the State has presumably deemed 
such ex-felons worthy of participating in civic life.” (citation omitted)); Andrea 
Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner’s Campaign:  Felony Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right to 
Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801, 804-08 (reviewing state positions on re-
strictions on former felons’ right to hold public office). 
114 See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 65 (2003). 
115 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 609. 
116 See supra note 53. 
117 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898); see also Upshaw v. McNamara, 
435 F.2d 1188, 1189-90 (1st Cir. 1970) (upholding a restriction on public employ-
ment); M & Z Cab Corp. v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 941, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(upholding denial of a taxi medallion). 
118 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (upholding the disqualifica-
tion of ex-felons from waterfront union office). 
119 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960) (upholding the denial of So-
cial Security benefits on the basis of a statute that denied benefits to those deported for 
criminal convictions); see also supra note 109. 
120 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). 
121 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997). 
122 A number of opinions recognize that inmates retain some civil rights.  See, e.g., 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating 
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”). 
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not be denied the right to marry;123 and so people with convictions 
who are not in prison, on probation, or on parole cannot be arbitrarily 
prohibited from marrying.  Nor, probably, could a legislature require 
the sterilization of convicted people, at least without careful line-
drawing and process.124  Nevertheless, an extremely broad range of 
restrictions is permissible, so long as the restrictions are regulatory and 
rational within the meaning of the law. 
2.  Innovative Collateral Consequences 
Because collateral consequences are not, strictly speaking, punish-
ment, existing limitations may be imposed retroactively on people not 
subject to them at the time of conviction.  In addition, states are free 
to create new restrictions in previously unregulated areas.  Thus, if 
rational basis review125 is taken seriously, then it appears that a truly 
unfortunate and spectacular range of potential discriminations may be 
visited long after the fact on those convicted of crime. 
It would seem that virtually all denials of public benefits or services 
are rational because such benefits direct scarce resources to the most 
deserving.  The federal government could, apparently, deny applica-
tions for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid from some or all 
people with felony convictions126—because “conservation of funds con-
stitutes a rational basis on which to deny assistance to convicted felons 
and sex offenders.”127  In the absence of some positive federal law to 
the contrary, states apparently could deny people with convictions 
 
123 Id. at 91. 
124 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (striking 
down a law mandating sterilization of repeat offenders convicted of larceny but not 
embezzlement). 
125 As FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. summarized, 
On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute . . . comes to us bearing a 
strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legisla-
tive classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which 
might support it.  Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articu-
late its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional 
purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually 
motivated the legislature.  Thus, the absence of legislative facts explaining the 
distinction in a record has no significance in rational-basis analysis. 
508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126 For example, 21 U.S.C. § 862(b) allows state and federal sentencing judges to 
deny federal benefits to those convicted of drug possession offenses.  See Students for 
Sensible Drug Policy Found. v. Spellings, 523 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2008). 
127 Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008). 
G Chin FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/11/2012 3:03 PM 
1812 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1789 
access to public hospitals, higher education, and state benefit pro-
grams for the same reason. 
Courts could find virtually all employment and licensing re-
strictions rational, as long as the job or occupation is one for which 
honesty, integrity, and moral character are relevant, for “[i]t is not 
open to doubt that the commission of crime—the violation of the pe-
nal laws of a state—has some relation to the question of character.”128  
It is hard to imagine a job so insignificant and inconsequential that it 
could be done as well by a person of bad character as by someone 
who was hard working and honest.  Because public employment is 
both a public benefit and a public trust, perhaps all restrictions in 
that area are rational. 
Registration requirements, which originated outside the sex offender 
context,129 are now returning to their roots, with more jurisdictions 
requiring the registration of people with records involving non-sex 
crimes.130  Although Lambert v. California held that a particular person 
with a conviction could not be held liable for nonregistration based on 
the facts of that case,131 the Court did not hint that criminal registra-
tion might be unconstitutional in general.132 
One novel restriction is the limitation on the residence and move-
ment of people convicted of sex offenses.  The North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that people with criminal records can be denied 
access to public parks.133  Although some residential restrictions have 
been struck down on state law grounds,134 including under state ex 
 
128 Barsky v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 111 N.E.2d 222, 226 (N.Y. 1953) (quot-
ing Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898)), aff’d, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
129 See WAYNE LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER:  CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COM-
MUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 20-48 (2009) (tracing the early development 
of registration requirements in the United States). 
130 See id. at 73-74 (discussing non-sex offender criminal registration requirements 
in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Tennessee); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 775.13 (West 2005) (providing for general felon registration). 
131 See 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (holding registration law unconstitutional as 
applied because defendant “did not know of the duty to register and . . . there was no 
proof of the probability of such knowledge”). 
132 See id. at 229 (“Registration laws are common and their range is wide.”). 
133 See Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 729 (N.C. 2008) (upholding 
ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from entering public parks owned, operated, or 
maintained by the municipality); see also Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 758 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding a prohibition on a particular sex offender’s entering 
into any of the city’s parks). 
134 See, e.g., Terrance v. City of Geneva, 799 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1207 (Pa. 2011). 
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post facto clauses,135 many courts considering the question have held 
that these restrictions are not ex post facto punishments, but instead 
reasonable regulations136—even if they mean that for practical purpos-
es a person cannot legally live anywhere in a particular city.137 
Bare majorities of the Sixth Circuit138 and the North Carolina Su-
preme Court139 upheld a satellite-based monitoring (SBM) program.  
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court invalidated one by an 
equally close margin.140  The North Carolina Court described the pro-
gram as remarkably burdensome and intrusive.  Participants are re-
quired to 
wear a transmitter, which is a bracelet held in place by a strap worn around 
one ankle. . . . Second, participants wear a miniature tracking device 
(MTD) around the shoulder or at the waistline on a belt.  The MTD may 
not be hidden under clothing.  The device contains the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) receiver and is tethered to the ankle bracelet by a radio-
frequency (RF) signal. . . . The MTD includes an electronic screen that 
 
135 See Wayne Logan, Populism and Punishment:  Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification in the Courts, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 37, 39-40 (discussing a variety of state 
court cases relying on ex post facto arguments to invalidate residential restrictions). 
136 See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that residency requirements were not punishment); Crawford v. State, No. 
CR-09-1883, 2011 WL 2658813, at *9 (Ala. Crim. App. July 8, 2011) (holding that a 
residency restriction was not an ex post facto law due to a lack of punitive effect); Peo-
ple v. Picklesimer, 226 P.3d 348, 358 (Cal. 2010) (finding that sex offender residency 
restrictions were not punishment).  But see, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. Cortez Masto, 719 F. 
Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (D. Nev. 2008) (finding registration and residency restriction laws 
to be “the equivalent [of] a new punishment tacked on to the original sentence . . . in 
violation of the Ex Post Facto . . . Clause[]”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 08-17471, 09-
16008, 2012 WL 414664 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2012); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 7 (Me. 
2009) (concluding that retroactive application of new sex offender registration and in-
person verification requirements were punitive).  See generally Marjorie A. Shields, An-
notation, Validity of Statutes Imposing Residency Restrictions on Registered Sex Offenders, 25 
A.L.R. 6th 227, 305-16 (2007) (collecting cases where residency laws were held consti-
tutional or not); William M. Howard, Jr., Validity of State Sex Offender Registration Laws 
Under Ex Post Facto Prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351, 378-427 (2011) (discussing validity of 
state sex offender registration laws under ex post facto principles). 
137 See Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality 
in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1080-81 (2012) (providing exam-
ples of sex offenders forced to leave their homes to comply with residency require-
ments); Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba!:  The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and 
Employment Restrictions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 339, 350-51 (2007) (discussing the effects of 
restrictions on sex offenders, including being forced to quit their jobs and move). 
138 Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (2-1 decision).  See generally 
Frank Jaehoon Lee, Note, Severing the Invisible Leash:  A Challenge to Tennessee’s Sex Of-
fender Monitoring Act in Doe v. Bredesen, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 696-99 (2010). 
139 State v. Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 2010) (4-3 decision). 
140 Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 198 (Mass. 2009) (4-3 decision). 
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displays text messages communicating possible violations or information to 
the participant.  Third, a base unit is required for charging the MTD’s bat-
tery . . . . The MTD requires at least six hours of charging per twenty-four 
hour period.
141
 
In another case, a North Carolina court upheld the SBM program 
against an ex post facto challenge even though the program rules im-
posed a curfew, required a daily schedule, and necessitated six hours 
at home to charge the tracking device.142 
Regulation of this kind is costly, which ordinarily might deter states 
from creating and expanding such programs.  However, statutes often 
require the people being monitored to pay the costs;143 these require-
ments have been upheld.144 
If residence and movement restrictions and monitoring require-
ments are rational and not punishment as applied to sex offenders, 
then there is a strong argument that they are also rational and not 
punishment for those convicted of other crimes.  If children and oth-
ers should be protected from sex offenders, then surely it is rational 
that they be protected from drug offenders, those who committed vio-
lent offenses or offenses with high possibilities of violence such as bur-
glary, or, for that matter, from serial quality-of-life misdemeanants.145 
3.  No Right to Notice at Plea or Sentence 
Because collateral consequences have traditionally been under-
stood as civil and nonpunitive, a defendant has not been constitution-
ally entitled to notice of existing restrictions from the Court before 
pleading guilty or to advice about the restrictions from defense coun-
 
141 Bowditch, 700 S.E.2d at 4. 
142 State v. Vogt, 685 S.E.2d 23, 26 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (2-1 decision), aff’d per curi-
am, 700 S.E.2d 224 (N.C. 2010) (4-3 decision).  But see id. at 24 n.7 (reserving ability of 
monitorees to challenge particular features of the rules). 
143 See ALA. CODE § 15-20A-20(e) (Westlaw through Act 2012-78 of 2012 Reg. Sess.) 
(“Anyone subject to electronic monitoring pursuant to this section, unless he or she is 
indigent, shall be required to reimburse the supervising entity a reasonable fee to defray 
supervision costs . . . [and] such amount shall not exceed fifteen dollars ($15) per day.”). 
144 See, e.g., In re DNA Ex Post Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 2009) (up-
holding a requirement that prisoners pay for DNA testing against an ex post facto chal-
lenge); State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 739-40, 749-50 (La. 2001) 
(upholding a requirement that offenders bear expenses of community notification); 
Commonwealth v. Derk, 895 A.2d 622, 630 & n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (rejecting ex 
post facto challenge to a $250 fee for processing a DNA sample that the sentencing 
judge ordered the defendant to submit). 
145 Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (upholding as rational 
a ban on two unrelated persons living in a single housing unit). 
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sel when considering how to proceed in the case.146  Deportation is, at 
the moment, the important exception.  In March 2010 in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky, seven Justices voted that the Sixth Amendment required defense 
counsel to advise clients about the possibility that a guilty plea would 
lead to deportation.147  Some lower courts have applied the advice re-
quirement of Padilla to other collateral consequences,148 but the Su-
preme Court itself has not yet indicated how broadly Padilla will apply.  
As a general matter, people plead guilty to relatively minor offenses 
with relatively small punishments having no idea of what could happen 
to them, other than the possibility of deportation.  Or, they plead 
guilty because they do know what will happen and they can live with it, 
but years later, the legislature adds additional collateral consequences 
(possibly including, of course, deportation) to an old conviction. 
In sum, particularly in cases where the traditional forms of pun-
ishment are relatively light, collateral consequences will be one of the 
major effects of the criminal judgment.  Yet, under the law as it now 
exists, it is not clear that the defendant has a right to be advised of the 
most important legal effects of the decision to enter a plea agreement. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW CIVIL DEATH 
Although the Supreme Court has shown deference to legislatures 
when reviewing individual collateral consequences, its analysis and 
outcomes have been different when penalties systematically impair 
legal status.  As explained below, the traditional form of civil death was 
widely regarded as punishment.  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
held that certain other sanctions analogous to civil death are subject to 
 
146 Recent cases include Davis v. Russell, No. 08-0138, 2011 WL 1770932, at *12 
(E.D. Mo. May 10, 2011) (“Petitioner's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of 
counsel and the plea court did not violate Petitioner's federal constitutional rights by 
failing to advise Petitioner that he may be subject to civil commitment . . . upon his 
release from prison . . . .”); Rigger v. State, 341 S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2010) (“A trial court has no duty to advise a guilty-pleading defendant of a collateral 
consequence of his plea.”); Carroll v. Commonwealth, 701 S.E.2d 414, 420 (Va. 2010) 
(holding that a plea was not invalid for failure of the court to warn of collateral conse-
quence).  See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel 
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 703-12 (2002) (discussing 
the general rule that counsel is not required to warn about collateral consequences); 
Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss:  Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinfor-
mation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 131-34 (2009) (same). 
147 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
148 See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after Padilla v. Kentucky:  From 
Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 105-11 (2011) (discussing 
lower court cases applying Padilla beyond deportation). 
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Eighth Amendment scrutiny because of their systematic effects on an 
individual’s legal status.  Finally, the Court has considered the fact that 
criminal convictions impose a range of collateral consequences in 
shaping the rights to counsel, jury trial, and other aspects of criminal 
procedure.  These holdings suggest that civil death is an effect of a 
criminal judgment of constitutional magnitude. 
A.  Civil Death and Collateral Consequences as Punishment 
By referring to attainder—one aspect of which is civil death—as 
punishment, the Constitution suggests that civil death is punish-
ment.149  In addition, the Supreme Court has so held.  In Johnson v. 
Rockefeller, a three-judge district court upheld the New York civil death 
statute’s ban on marriages by inmates serving life sentences;150 the Su-
preme Court summarily affirmed.151  The district court’s opinion sug-
gested that the legislative prohibition was justified as a form of pun-
punishment:  “A state has considerable freedom within the limits of 
the Eighth Amendment in determining what form punishment for 
crime shall take.  Deprivation of physical liberty is not the sole permis-
sible consequence of a criminal conviction.”152  The court also rejected 
the claim that the law was infirm because inmates serving nonlife sen-
tences were allowed to marry:  “The fact that the state has provided 
less severe punishment for less serious crime does not invalidate its 
continued ban on marriage as an additional punishment for crimes of 
the most serious nature.”153 
The Supreme Court later offered a definitive judgment that civil 
death was punishment.  In Turner v. Safley, the Court held that prison 
officials could not prohibit marriage as a correctional rule.154  However, 
the Court distinguished rather than overruled Johnson.  The Court ex-
plained that Johnson turned on the ground that the prohibition there 
 
149 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
150 Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d mem. sub 
nom. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974). 
151 Butler, 415 U.S. 953. 
152 Johnson, 365 F. Supp. at 380. 
153 Id. at 381 n.3.  But cf. id. at 381 & n.1 (Lasker, J., concurring) (agreeing that the 
“marriage bar may be regarded as a punishment” but contending that “this point is not 
free from doubt”). 
154 482 U.S. 78, 97 (1987). 
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applied “only [to] inmates sentenced to life imprisonment; and, im-
portantly, denial of the right was part of the punishment for crime.”155 
More recently, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, referred to civil death as punish-
ment.156  Many other authorities157 and commentators158 have also char-
acterized civil death in punitive terms. 
 
155 Id. at 96; see also Langone v. Coughlin, 712 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(finding the restriction under the New York law as amended to be irrational even 
though “punishment is the primary justification for the marriage prohibition”). 
156 See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 647 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(discussing an English statute declaring Bishop Francis Atterbury a traitor and “sub-
ject[ing] him to a range of punishments not previously imposed, including exile and 
civil death.  The Duke of Wharton, who registered the lengthiest dissent, commented 
that ‘this Bill seems as irregular in the punishments it inflicts, as it is in its foundation, 
and carries with it an unnatural degree of hardship.’” (citations omitted)); see also 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 453 & n.8 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that under French law, civil death was one of the punishments leading to infamy). 
157 See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the historical function of disenfranchisement and civil death was 
punishment); Villalon v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409, 412 (Nev. 1954) (“[E]ven where a stat-
ute has incorporated [civil death] as a part of the punishment for crime, the courts 
have been reluctant to invoke it unless the express language of the statute left no es-
cape and compelled them to do so.” (quoting Annotation, Civil Effects of Sentence to Life 
Imprisonment, 139 A.L.R. 1308, 1310 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cole 
v. Campbell, 968 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1998) (“Tennessee does not have a civil death 
statute . . . . In addition, the limits of punishment are set by the Legislature and no 
punishment may be imposed without statutory authority.  Accordingly, the [court be-
low] erred in concluding that the convicted felon . . . lacked standing to file an action 
to seek public records under the Public Records Act.”); see also Deutch v. Hoffman, 211 
Cal. Rptr. 319, 320 (Ct. App. 1985) (“Statutes relating to civil death or the suspension 
of civil rights are penal in nature and are to be strictly construed.”); Hughes v. Dwyer, 
546 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (“Upon conviction for a felony the English 
Common Law assessed the additional penalty of ‘attainder’ which included the con-
cepts of forfeiture, corruption of the blood and civil death. . . . It is evident that the civil 
death statute, being penal in nature, has received a rigid interpretation from the Mis-
souri courts.”); Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. Ch. 118, 131 (N.Y. Ch. 1822) (“The penal 
consequences of attainder must be necessary deductions, severely required by the 
premises . . . .”). 
158 See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *377 (“Some punishments 
consist in exile or banishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation to the 
American colonies:  others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprison-
ment. . . . [O]thers induce a disability, of holding offices or employments, being heirs, 
executors, and the like.”); 2 POLITICAL DICTIONARY, FORMING A WORK OF UNIVERSAL 
REFERENCE, BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL 604 (1846) (“[A]ll the known punish-
ments have involved the infliction of pain by different means, as death, mutilation of 
the body, flogging or beating, privation of bodily liberty by confinement of various 
sorts, banishment, forced labour, privation of civil rights, pecuniary fine.”); Robert D. 
Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law:  The Role of Custom in American 
Indian Tribal Courts (pt. II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509, 534 n.53 (1998) (“A ‘civil death,’ 
which arose historically . . . as a punishment for wrongdoing, implied that the person 
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Two Supreme Court cases invalidating punishments analogous to 
civil death suggest the punitive nature of civil death.  In Weems v. United 
States159 and Trop v. Dulles,160 the Court found total destruction of a per-
son’s legal status in society to be cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment. 
Weems originated in the Philippines which was a U.S. territory at the 
time.  The Court in Weems invalidated the cadena temporal, a punish-
ment where, for a period of years, the person sentenced would be 
imprisoned and perform hard labor for the State.161  In addition to the 
hard labor, those sentenced to cadena temporal would thereafter suffer 
“accessory penalties,”162 namely, “civil interdiction,”163 “perpetual abso-
lute disqualification,”164 and “subjection to surveillance during life.”165  
The Court regarded these penalties, clearly recognizable as versions of 
modern collateral consequences, as harsh: 
 
ceases to be a legal person and loses the rights of a person.”); R.A. Lenhardt, Under-
standing the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 917 (2004) 
(noting that some penal systems imposed “a kind of ‘civil death’ as further punish-
ment”); Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars:  Toward the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfran-
chisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71, 73-74 (2003) (“Criminal 
disenfranchisement has its roots in the punishment of ‘civil death,’ imposed for crimi-
nal offences under Greek, Roman, Germanic and later Anglo-Saxon law.” (footnote 
omitted)); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:  The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 
985, 985 n.4 (1962) (“Civil death statutes have been sustained as valid exercises of legis-
lative power to prescribe punishment for crimes.” (citing Quick v. W. Ry., 92 So. 608 
(Ala. 1922))); see also Quick, 92 So. at 609 (upholding a civil death statute by finding 
that it did “not appear ever to have been supposed that the Legislature might not im-
pose disability to sue as punishment for crime”). 
159 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  See generally Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow in American Leg-
islation”:  Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 251 
(2006) (discussing the facts and holding of Weems). 
160 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
161 See Weems, 217 U.S. at 364 (“They shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging 
from the wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no 
assistance whatsoever from without the institution.”). 
162 Id. 
163 See id. (“Civil interdiction shall deprive the person punished, as long as he suf-
fers it, of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of person or property, partici-
pation in the family council, marital authority, the administration of property, and the 
right to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos.”). 
164 See id. at 364-65 (“The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification is the dep-
rivation of office, even though it be held by popular election, the deprivation of the 
right to vote or to be elected to public office, the disqualification to acquire honors, 
etc., and the loss of retirement pay, etc.”). 
165 See id. at 364 (noting that subjection to surveillance required the person pun-
ished to lawfully support himself by “some trade, art, industry, or profession,” submit to 
inspection, report his residence to authorities, and obtain permission before moving). 
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His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he 
goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty.  He is forever kept 
under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view of the 
criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving 
notice to the “authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,” and 
without permission in writing.  He may not seek, even in other scenes and 
among other people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude.  Even that hope is 
taken from him and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so 
tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, 
and deprive of essential liberty.
166
 
The Court was also concerned about the portion of the sentence involv-
ing painful labor,167 and it is difficult to identify precisely what about 
the nature and degree of cadena temporal made it unconstitutional.168  
Nevertheless, the “accessory penalties” were a basis,169 perhaps the 
most important basis, for the Court’s ruling.170 
 
166 Id. at 366. 
167 See id. (“What painful labor may mean we have no exact measure.  It must be 
something more than hard labor.”). 
168 The relatively minor nature of the crime at issue, a false entry in a government 
financial record, also gave the Court pause.  “It must be confessed that [the sentencing 
laws], and the sentence in this case, excite wonder in minds accustomed to a more 
considerate adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime.”  Id. at 365. 
169 See id. at 377 (“It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompa-
nies and follows imprisonment.  It is unusual in its character.  Its punishments come 
under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and 
kind.”); see also Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 
1071, 1075 (1964) (“It was plainly not the length of the imprisonment alone, consid-
ered in relation to the gravity of the offense, that determined the result.  Rather, it was 
the combination of an excessive but conventional mode of punishment with a good 
deal of laid-on unpleasantness offensive for its novelty as well as its severity that sup-
ported the characterization of Weems’ punishment as cruel and unusual.”). 
170 Sentences to hard labor were constitutionally uncontroversial.  In any event, the 
Court affirmed many such convictions.  See, e.g., Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 
91 (1911) (upholding the lower court’s penalty of life at hard labor for murder), over-
ruled on other grounds by Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).  This outcome held 
true even for nonhomicide cases.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 198 U.S. 156, 157 
(1905) (embezzlement); Hall v. United States, 168 U.S. 632, 634 (1898) (mail theft).  
Given this, Justice White, dissenting for himself and Justice Holmes, concluded “that 
the accessory punishments are the basis of the ruling now made.”  Weems, 217 U.S. at 
412 (White, J., dissenting).  White argued that the accessory punishments, even if un-
constitutional, were severable.  Id.  The majority’s response indicated that White cor-
rectly perceived the centrality of the accessory punishment:  “It is suggested that the 
provision for imprisonment in the Philippine Code is separable from the accessory 
punishment, and that the latter may be declared illegal, leaving the former to have 
application.”  Id. at 381.  Instead of holding that the conditions of imprisonment would 
themselves have invalidated the sentence, the Court concluded that the accessory pun-
ishments were not severable.  Id. at 381-82.  For further evidence that Justice White 
doubted the constitutionality of total deprivation of status, see the discussion of Hovey 
v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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A half-century later in Trop v. Dulles, five Justices found another 
“accessory penalty”—expatriation or denationalization of a United 
States citizen—to be cruel and unusual because it destroyed legal per-
sonality.171  They ruled that Congress had no power to punish a U.S. 
citizen with denationalization for desertion in time of war.172  The citi-
zen could be executed, they explained, but deprivation of citizenship 
was cruel and unusual.173 
The plurality opinion suggested that denationalization is substan-
tially similar to civil death.  By imposing denationalization as punish-
ment, they explained, 
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture.  
There is instead the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized 
society.  It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it de-
stroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the de-
velopment. . . . In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.
174
 
Uncertainty based on the possibility of future discrimination was 
the key feature making “[t]his punishment . . . offensive to cardinal 
principles for which the Constitution stands.”175  Justice Brennan’s 
opinion, providing the necessary fifth vote, also found the uncertainty 
created by the status to be critical.176  
 
171 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
172 Id. at 103. 
173 See id. at 99 (“Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no 
argument that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of 
the crime.  The question is whether this penalty subjects the individual to a fate forbid-
den by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.”); see 
also id. at 112 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“And as a deterrent device this sanction would 
appear of little effect, for the offender, if not deterred by thought of the specific penal-
ties of long imprisonment or even death, is not very likely to be swayed from his course 
by the prospect of expatriation.”). 
174 Id. at 101-02 (plurality opinion). 
175 Id. at 102; see also id. (“It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear 
and distress.  He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what 
proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence 
in his native land may be terminated.”). 
176 Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion was joined by Justices Black, Douglas, 
and Whittaker.  Id. at 87.  Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion was consistent with the 
plurality.  First, Justice Brennan concluded that because “expatriation is made a conse-
quence of desertion, it must stand together with death and imprisonment—as a form 
of punishment.”  Id. at 110 (Brennan, J., concurring).  In addition, he agreed with the 
plurality that the uncertainty created by the consequence was central.  Because 
American law has had little experience with this status . . . [its] ultimate impact 
on the petitioner [is] unknown and unknowable. . . . [While he] may perhaps 
live, work, marry, raise a family, and generally experience a satisfactorily happy 
life . . . [t]he uncertainty, and the consequent psychological hurt, which must 
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The dissenters insisted that expatriation was not punishment.177  
They also insisted that if it were, it would not be cruel and unusual 
because its consequences would be limited.178  The dissenters claimed 
that noncitizens in the United States enjoyed a much greater set of 
rights than convicted persons in fifteenth century England:  “He 
need not be in constant fear lest some dire and unforeseen fate be 
imposed on him by arbitrary governmental action—certainly not 
while [the Supreme Court] sits.”179  Thus, on this point, the dissenters 
would apparently have agreed that a punishment subjecting an of-
fender to an open-ended range of discrimination and disability was 
constitutionally doubtful. 
If civil death, old or new, were entirely equivalent to cadena tem-
poral and expatriation, then it would be an unconstitutional cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Whatever may be said for this, the tradi-
tional permissibility of civil death suggests that a doctrinal argument 
that the new civil death is now unconstitutional would be challenging.  
Nevertheless, Trop and Weems make clear that profound impairment of 
legal personality is constitutionally significant. 
B.  Collateral Consequences and Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that noncitizen cli-
ents considering guilty pleas were entitled to be warned about the pos-
sibility of deportation,180 even though deportation was not a criminal 
punishment.181  Dissenting for himself and Justice Thomas, Justice 
Scalia argued, “The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer 
‘for his defense’ against a ‘criminal prosecutio[n]’—not for sound ad-
vice about the collateral consequences of conviction.”182  Scalia’s prop-
osition is consistent with the body of cases holding that deportation 
and other collateral consequences are not criminal punishment. 
 
accompany one who becomes an outcast in his own land must be reckoned a 
substantial factor in the ultimate judgment. 
Id. at 110-11; see also id. at 110 n.7 (“[T]his very uncertainty of the consequences makes 
expatriation as punishment severe.”).  In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Brennan indicated 
his support for the Trop plurality opinion.  408 U.S. 238, 271 & n.13 (1972) (Brennan, 
J., concurring). 
177 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 124-25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
178 Id. at 127. 
179 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010). 
181 See id. at 1481 (“[R]emoval proceedings are civil in nature . . . .” (citing INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984))). 
182 Id. at 1494. 
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But the argument overlooks another line of authority in which the 
Court understood collateral consequences to be an important part of 
the criminal justice system.  Indeed, in a little-noticed line of cases, 
unmentioned in Padilla, the Court has relied on collateral conse-
quences, among other considerations, to shape the contours of consti-
tutional criminal procedure. 
At the broadest level of generality, the Court has frequently noted 
that a criminal conviction carries with it “opprobrium and stigma.”183 
The important stigma here is not mere social or reputational disad-
vantage; it is crystallized in law in the form of collateral consequences.184  
The Court has recognized that a purpose and an effect of prosecu-
tions are to impose collateral consequences.  Accordingly, collateral 
consequences prevent a criminal case from becoming moot on appeal 
or being collaterally attacked even after expiration of the sentence.185  
 
183 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997); see also, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 
U.S. 322, 334 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Opprobrium attaches 
to conviction of . . . crimes [punishable by more than six months incarceration] regard-
less of the length of the actual sentence imposed, and the stigma itself is enough to 
entitle the defendant to a jury. . . . [C]onvictions for petty offenses do not carry the 
same stigma as convictions for serious crimes.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976) (“The right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any 
kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, 
is a principle basic to our society.” (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); United States  v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286 (1943) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (“Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such citizen 
the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous.”). 
184 As the Court explained in Lawrence v. Texas, 
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial.  The offense, 
to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas legal sys-
tem.  Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of 
the persons charged. . . . We are advised that if Texas convicted an adult for 
private, consensual homosexual conduct . . . the convicted person would come 
within the registration laws of at least four States were he or she to be subject to 
their jurisdiction.  This underscores the consequential nature of the punish-
ment and the state-sponsored condemnation attendant to the criminal prohibi-
tion.  Furthermore, the Texas criminal conviction carries with it the other 
collateral consequences always following a conviction, such as notations on job 
application forms, to mention but one example. 
539 U.S. 558, 575-76 (2003) (citations omitted). 
185 See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1998); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 
40, 55-57 (1968); see also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954) (holding 
that the defendant could challenge an old federal conviction through coram nobis 
when it increased the sentence under a subsequent state conviction).  However, 
“[o]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral 
consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual 
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Conversely, the Court has recognized that one of the states’ inter-
ests in criminal convictions is to impose collateral consequences.  Ac-
cordingly, “even after a defendant has served the full measure of his 
sentence, a State retains a strong interest in preserving the convictions 
it has obtained.  States impose a wide range of disabilities on those 
who have been convicted of crimes, even after their release.”186  
The Court has often characterized collateral consequences as pun-
ishment.  The Court explained in 1892 that when the State imposes 
consequences such as “attainder, or infamy, or incompetency of a con-
vict to testify,” these consequences are “strictly penal.”187  In Ball v.  
United States, the Court found an invalid sentence to be “an impermis-
sible punishment” even though it was concurrent with another valid 
sentence, because of “potential adverse collateral consequences that 
may not be ignored.”188 
The Court often considers collateral consequences in evaluating 
whether there is a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  A 
primary example is Padilla v. Kentucky itself, but there are many earlier 
examples.  In Argersinger v. Hamlin, Justices Powell and Rehnquist 
found the collateral consequences of misdemeanors important in de-
ciding that the right to counsel should extend beyond felonies.189  
They explained, “When the deprivation of property rights and interest is 
 
‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.”  Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 
492 (1989). 
186 Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 379 (2001); see also Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 n.3 (1977) (“If the prospect of the State’s visit-
ing . . . collateral consequences on a criminal defendant who has served his sentence is 
a sufficient burden as to enable him to seek reversal of a decision affirming his convic-
tion, the prospect of the State’s inability to impose such a burden following a reversal 
of the conviction of a criminal defendant in its own courts must likewise be sufficient to 
enable the State to obtain review of its claims on the merits here.”). 
187 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892); see also Singleton v. State, 21 So. 
21, 23 (Fla. 1896) (explaining that testimonial “disability is as much a part of the pains 
and penalties of the violated law as incarceration, and, after conviction, it attaches as 
surely as any other part of the punishment”); State ex rel. Mitchell v. McDonald, 145 So. 
508, 511 (Miss. 1933) (“‘[T]he conviction of an infamous crime in a foreign country, or 
in any other of the United States, does not render the subject of such conviction an 
incompetent witness in the courts of this state,’ [since] ‘infamy is a punishment as well 
as stigma on character.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 515, 
515 (1822) and 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 522, at 939 n.3 (2d ed. 1923))). 
188 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985); see also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 
(1996) (“[C]ollateral consequences of a second conviction make it as presumptively 
impermissible to impose as it would be to impose any other unauthorized cumulative 
sentence.”). 
189 407 U.S. 25, 48 & n.11 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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of sufficient consequence, denying the assistance of counsel to indigents 
who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due process.”190 
Systematic effects on civil status also influenced some decisions on 
the right to jury trial.  In Baldwin v. New York, five members of the 
Court relied on the existence of collateral consequences in finding a 
right to a jury trial for misdemeanors.191  The plurality explained, 
“Both the convicted felon and the convicted misdemeanant may be 
prevented under New York law from engaging in a wide variety of oc-
cupations.  In addition, the convicted felon is deprived of certain civil 
rights, including the right to vote and to hold public office.”192  Dec-
ades later, Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Justice Breyer, 
found that collateral consequences justified recognition of a right to a 
jury trial for felonies and serious misdemeanors, regardless of sen-
tence.  “Opprobrium attaches to conviction of . . . crimes [punishable 
by more than six months incarceration] regardless of the length of the 
actual sentence imposed, and the stigma itself is enough to entitle the 
defendant to a jury.”193  Collateral consequences also informed the es-
 
190 Id.  In Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976), all of the Justices found collateral 
consequences to be relevant to the question of the right to counsel in summary courts 
martial.  Compare id. at 58 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing for a right to coun-
sel in “a summary court-martial conviction [because it] is . . . regarded as a criminal 
conviction . . . that . . . has collateral consequences both in military and civilian life”), 
with id. at 39 (majority opinion) (holding no right to counsel to exist in part becuase 
“[c]onviction . . . would likely have no consequences . . . beyond the immediate pun-
ishment meted out by the military, unlike conviction for such civilian misdemeanors as 
vagrancy or larceny which could carry a stamp of ‘bad character’ with conviction”).  
While in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, the Court held five to four that there was no right 
to counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions when no jail sentence was imposed, opinions 
of the four dissenters and Justice Powell’s concurrence recognized the importance of 
collateral consequences.  See id. at 382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The authorized 
penalty is also a better predictor of the stigma and other collateral consequences that 
attach to conviction of an offense.”); id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (conclud-
ing that “an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed 
counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offense . . . or 
whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of 
imprisonment” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 374-75 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
drawing of a line based on whether there is imprisonment (even for overnight) can 
have the practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in 
which conviction can have more serious consequences.”). 
191 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
192 Id. at 69 n.8; see also id. at 75 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
“imprisonment for less than six months may still have serious consequences”). 
193 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 334 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, joined by Justice Breyer, 
included the fact of collateral consequences as part of the “stigma” resulting from a 
criminal conviction.  See supra note 184; see also Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 
538, 543-45 (1989) (noting the possibility that nonincarceration penalties for a DUI 
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tablishment of the right to free transcripts on appeal for indigents even 
in minor cases,194 and the prohibition on prosecutorial vindictiveness.195 
Collateral consequences were hardly the only consideration shap-
ing these doctrines.  However, these cases show that the Court has 
long recognized, both explicitly and implicitly, that punitive collateral 
consequences are part of the stakes of criminal prosecutions, and as 
such, warrant consideration in determining the rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure. 
III.  TOWARD ACCOMMODATING THE NEW CIVIL 
DEATH INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Looking at individual collateral consequences in isolation, the Su-
preme Court has held that they are not punishment and has placed 
little substantive or procedural restriction on their imposition.  Yet the 
same Court has understood civil death and other systematic loss of sta-
tus as punishment and has used the existence of collateral conse-
quences to shape important criminal procedure doctrines, such as the 
rights to counsel and to jury trial. 
These two lines of cases have not been in dialogue with each other, 
but they are reconcilable.  Individual collateral consequences are not 
necessarily punishment; if the only collateral consequences of a drug 
conviction, for example, were that the defendant lost her driver’s 
license, then perhaps it would be appropriate to treat that loss as com-
pletely separate from the criminal case.  But convicted persons suffer a 
general loss of legal personality and status, which, as Trop and Weems 
suggest, is punishment.  As Chief Justice Warren explained, “Convic-
tion of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes 
him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, 
but which also seriously affects his reputation and economic opportu-
 
could trigger the right to a jury trial, but a ninety-day driver’s license suspension and 
the possibility of a higher sentence for a future offense was insufficient). 
194 See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971) (“The practical effects of 
conviction of even petty offenses of the kind involved here are not to be minimized.  A 
fine may bear as heavily on an indigent accused as forced confinement.  The collateral 
consequences of conviction may be even more serious, as when . . . the impecunious 
medical student finds himself barred from the practice of medicine because of a con-
viction he is unable to appeal for lack of funds.”). 
195 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 n.6 (1974) (invalidating an increase in 
charges from a misdemeanor to a felony based on the exercise of the right to appeal, 
noting that “conviction of a ‘felony’ often entails more serious collateral consequences 
than those incurred through a misdemeanor conviction”). 
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nities.”196  Whether or not any individual collateral consequence is 
punishment, the overall susceptibility to collateral consequences is 
punishment.  This is the case at least when, as now, there is a vigorous, 
existing network of collateral consequences.197 
In addition, even if being subjected to collateral consequences is 
not punishment, strictissimi juris, it may be within the scope of the 
criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Padilla v. Kentucky held that 
defendants were entitled to be warned by their lawyers about the pos-
sibility of deportation because, although not criminal,198 deportation 
followed conviction automatically,199 had a “close connection to the 
criminal process,”200 and was severe.201  Padilla required advice about a 
particular collateral consequence—deportation.  But deportation, like 
civil death or expatriation, has systematic effects on status.  It does not 
merely affect employment, or residence, or family relationships; in-
stead, it “may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that 
makes life worth living.”202  Deportation is simultaneously a specific 
collateral consequence and a systematic destruction of status. 
The new civil death is an implicit term of every criminal conviction, 
and it is within the zone of concern of constitutional criminal proce-
 
196 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled by 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). 
197 As an analogy, no one would claim that each of the individual disadvantages of 
imprisonment—subjection to classification, prison rules, solitary confinement, mail 
restrictions, transfer—is a separate punishment that must be explained at a guilty plea.  
But imprisonment is punishment.  See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 698 F.2d 31, 33 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (holding that withholding information regarding the parole evaluation pro-
cess did not violate “the principles of due process”); Houston v. Lack, 625 F. Supp. 786, 
790-91 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (refusing to require advising felons about ineligibility for pro-
grams that could reduce their sentences), aff’d per curiam, No. 86-5198, 1989 WL 47448 
(6th Cir. May 9, 1989); State v. Parker, 629 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (finding 
no due process obligation to warn of a possible transfer to an out-of-state prison). 
198 See 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010) (holding that “when the deportation conse-
quence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear”); see, e.g., Mar-
garet Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky:  Extending the 
Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2010, at 
36, 40 (analyzing the implications of Padilla); Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as 
Punishment:  A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 22 (same). 
199 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
200 Id. at 1482; see also id. at 1481 (“Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and 
the penalty of deportation for nearly a century.”). 
201 See id. at 1486 (“The severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of banishment or 
exile’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client 
that he faces a risk of deportation.” (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 
390-391 (1947))). 
202 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
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dure, either because it is punishment or based on the rationale of 
Padilla v. Kentucky.  This outcome has a number of implications for the 
criminal justice process. 
A.  Ex Post Facto 
One important concern is whether imposing new or different col-
lateral consequences after conviction amounts to an ex post facto law 
and is therefore unconstitutional.  If the new civil death is not pun-
ishment, then of course, there would be no significant ex post facto 
issue.  If the new civil death is punishment, there still is no significant 
issue.  In 1960, Chief Justice Warren opined, accurately, that convic-
tion worked a change in legal status.203  Thus, while the particulars of 
the regime of collateral consequences change from time to time, by 
1960 (or perhaps earlier), it was clear that the State could deprive 
convicted persons of civil rights, public benefits, occupational licenses, 
and employment in regulated industries, subject only to minimal judi-
cial review.  It was also clear that deprivations could be imposed retro-
actively as well as prospectively. 
B.  Notice 
In the past, courts have held that neither the court nor counsel had 
a duty to advise clients of collateral consequences at the time of a 
plea.204  Accordingly, clients pleaded guilty without knowing what was 
really at stake.  With full knowledge, in some instances, they may have 
concluded that it was worth the risk of going to trial to avoid an oner-
ous collateral consequence, or important enough to sell assets or bor-
row money to finance a more vigorous defense, given their 
understanding of the true nature of the downside risk.  In addition, if 
consideration of collateral consequences were a Sixth Amendment 
duty, clients would ask for, and attorneys would seek, available plea 
bargains to other offenses that might avoid severe consequences. 
One reason for the lack of a duty of advice was the general conclu-
sion that collateral consequences are not punishment.  Courts rea-
soned that the duty of advice is limited to the “direct” consequences of 
the plea, such as a prison sentence or fine.  The automatic and puni-
tive nature of civil death makes it a direct consequence, but even if it 
 
203 Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled 
by Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). 
204 See sources cited supra note 146. 
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were not, the Supreme Court in Padilla noted that while the distinc-
tion was employed by lower courts, the Supreme Court had “never ap-
plied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to 
define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assis-
tance.’”205 The Supreme Court has held that “a guilty plea ‘not only 
must be voluntary but must be a knowing, intelligent act done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences.’”206  The consequence of civil death is a penalty that follows 
conviction with certainty. 
Courts can much more readily advise defendants about civil death 
than about numerous individual collateral consequences.207  One rea-
son courts in the past found no duty to advise was that court and coun-
sel may not be aware that individual collateral consequences exist, 
because they may be in an obscure, noncriminal statute or regulation.  
In addition, the court may not be aware of the facts showing that a 
particular collateral consequence is potentially or actually applicable 
to the particular client.208  But the new civil death applies to each and 
every person who pleads guilty to a crime.  Therefore, determination 
of its applicability requires no legal or factual investigation or analysis 
by the court.  In addition, it applies in exactly the same way to each 
and every person pleading guilty.209  Accordingly, it will not be neces-
sary to individualize the advisement; every person faces exactly the 
same change in legal status.  This point is consistent with requiring 
courts and counsel to advise of other extremely important collateral 
consequences like deportation and sex offender registration, which 
are also automatic and severe. 
 
205 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689 (1984)). 
206 Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319 (1983) (alterations omitted) (quoting Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
207 See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical:  Defense Counsel and Collateral Conse-
quences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 684-85 (2011) (describing the task of informing 
defendants of collateral consequences as “herculean”). 
208 See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994) (rejecting a claim that 
courts should warn uncounseled misdemeanor defendants of the possibility of a higher 
sentence if convicted of another crime); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d 
Cir. 1963) (“[U]nsolicited advice concerning the collateral consequences of a plea 
which necessitates judicial clairvoyance of a superhuman kind can be neither expected 
nor required.”); Joseph v. Esperdy, 267 F. Supp. 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“[I]t seems 
onerous and absurd to expect a judge to explain to each and every defendant who 
pleads guilty the full range of collateral consequences of his plea and, indeed, to antic-
ipate what those collateral consequences are.” (emphasis omitted)). 
209 That is, like minority, alienage, or expatriation, civil death is a single legal status.  
Like all of those things, it will bear on particular individuals differently. 
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Models promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission and the 
American Bar Association210 require broad notice of collateral conse-
quences.  The Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act 
contains a general warning which offers plain language covering much 
of the territory: 
NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 
 If you plead guilty or are convicted of an offense you may suffer addi-
tional legal consequences beyond jail or prison, [probation] [insert juris-
diction’s alternative term for probation], periods of [insert term for post-
incarceration supervision], and fines.  These consequences may include: 
 being unable to get or keep some licenses, permits, or jobs; 
 being unable to get or keep benefits such as public housing or 
education; 
 receiving a harsher sentence if you are convicted of another offense 
in the future; 
 having the government take your property; and 
 being unable to vote or possess a firearm. 
 If you are not a United States citizen, a guilty plea or conviction may 
also result in your deportation, removal, exclusion from admission to the 
United States, or denial of citizenship. 
 The law may provide ways to obtain some relief from these conse-
quences.
211
 
The Act also provides that “[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendre from an individual, the court shall confirm that the 
 
210 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PLEAS OF GUILTY standard 14-1.4(c) 
(1997) (“[T]he court should also advise the defendant that by entering the plea, the 
defendant may face additional consequences including but not limited to the forfeiture 
of property, the loss of certain civil rights, disqualification from certain governmental 
benefits, enhanced punishment if the defendant is convicted of another crime in the 
future, and, if the defendant is not a United States citizen, a change in the defendant’s 
immigration status.”); id. standard 14-3.2(f) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel 
should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any 
plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the con-
templated plea.”); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  COLLATERAL SANCTIONS 
AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS standard 19-2.3(a) 
(2003) (“[A] court [should] ensure, before accepting a plea of guilty, that the defend-
ant has been informed of collateral sanctions made applicable to the offense . . . . by 
confirming on the record that defense counsel’s duty of advisement under Standard 
14-3.2(f) has been discharged.”). 
211 UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 5(a) (2010). 
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individual received and understands the notice required by subsection 
(a) and had an opportunity to discuss the notice with counsel.”212 
C.  Consideration in Sentencing 
Legislatures punish offenders to achieve one or more ends.  Pun-
ishment can protect the public from future misconduct by individuals 
who have committed crimes by reducing the opportunities for an indi-
vidual to reoffend.  It can impose deprivations on an individual to 
communicate social disapproval for misconduct, balance the scales of 
justice, deter the individual or other potential offenders, and promote 
reflection by, and reformation of, the person punished.  All of these 
things can be achieved through the collateral consequences attendant 
to civil death, just as they can be through incarceration or other tradi-
tional forms of punishment. 
Because civil death serves the function of punishment, and is either 
punishment in the constitutional sense or its constitutional cousin, it is 
appropriate that actors in the criminal justice system account for it and 
use it.  The potential punishment for a criminal offense is considered 
at several places along the way. 
The first place is during charging and plea bargaining.  Prosecu-
tors, when considering what to charge, should take into account the 
potential effects of civil death.  The majority decision in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky held that it is appropriate for prosecutors and defense attorneys 
to plea bargain around collateral consequences.213  Justice Stevens noted 
that consideration of deportation would benefit both sides because it 
would give the defendant an opportunity to plead to something that 
would not lead to deportation, and it would benefit the prosecution by 
encouraging the defendant to accept that plea.214 
Another important stage is sentencing.  Sentencing is designed to 
impose punishment that is proportionate to the offense and consistent 
with that imposed on similar offenders.  These goals cannot be 
achieved without evaluating the total package of sentencing facing an 
individual.  Accordingly, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards provide 
that “[t]he legislature should authorize the sentencing court to take 
 
212 Id. § 5(b). 
213 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
214 Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment:  Immi-
gration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1435 (2011) (“[B]ased on 
negotiations with defense counsel, prosecutors regularly consider lesser charges, diver-
sion, or non-prosecution to allow relatively less serious offenders to avoid deportation.”). 
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into account, and the court should consider, applicable collateral 
sanctions in determining an offender’s overall sentence.”215 
D.  Legislative Reform 
Some groups have urged limitation of the use of collateral conse-
quences.216  There is no comprehensive, official collection of collateral 
consequences, which makes them more difficult to employ intelligently 
in individual cases and systematically.  Judges and lawyers cannot con-
sider the ones that exist, and legislatures cannot consider their overall 
structure, if they do not know what they are.  This problem is about to 
be solved.  Congress directed the National Institute of Justice to under-
take a fifty-state survey of collateral consequences, which is now un-
derway.217  Accordingly, in the reasonably near future, the legal effects 
of a criminal judgment should be more readily ascertainable. 
Once a complete picture emerges, legislatures should consider col-
lateral consequences in evaluating the overall fairness and severity of 
criminal punishment associated with particular offenses or classes of 
offenses.  Legislatures could decouple criminal conviction and civil 
death by applying disadvantages on a case-by-case basis, making them 
discretionary instead of automatic.218  Legislatures could also consider 
making relief readily available to those who maintain clean records for 
a period of time.219 
The fundamental question, though, is the overall burden of col-
lateral consequences.  Legislatures, of course, must ensure that public 
safety is maintained.  But if those convicted of crimes are under such 
 
215 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY 
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS standard 19-1.1. 
216 See id. standard 19-2.6 (listing collateral sanctions that legislatures should not 
impose, including deprivation of the right to vote, and other civil rights, public bene-
fits, and programs relevant to reentry); see also UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION ACT § 7 (2010) (limiting authority of subordinate levels of government to 
create mandatory collateral consequences and presuming that ambiguous sanctions are 
discretionary, not mandatory). 
217 Love, supra note 12, at 116 n.12. 
218 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRE-
TIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS standard 19-2.2 (stating that re-
strictions should be discretionary rather than automatic unless “the legislature cannot 
reasonably contemplate any circumstances in which imposing the sanction would not 
be justified”). 
219 See LOVE, supra note 68, at 96 (“Many people who commit a crime or even more 
than one crime make a reasonable effort to turn their lives around and stay out of 
trouble with the law.  It would seem sound public policy to encourage them to do so.”). 
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systematic and severe restrictions that it is difficult or impossible for 
them to support themselves and their families, former convicts will 
reoffend.  Further, legislatures decide fairness and efficiency of crim-
inal penalties, not mere constitutionality. 
CONCLUSION 
At common law, a consequence of being found to have committed 
a crime was the extinction of a person’s being, through execution or 
civil death.  Now, conviction is an increasingly common characteristic 
of people in free society, and the law does not provide that the tens of 
millions of Americans with criminal records, no matter how trivial, are 
written off permanently.  However, while the states have eliminated 
the formal regime of civil death, an equivalent system of legal depriva-
tion, in which most rights of people with criminal records are held at 
sufferance, has arisen to take its place. 
The new civil death is even more significant in its effects than his-
torical civil death.  The rise of mass conviction means a greater per-
centage of the population is subject to it.  And the rise of the regulatory 
state means that more important legal consequences flow from de-
graded legal status. 
The constitutional law of collateral consequences is equivocal 
about its treatment of the new civil death.  One major line of cases, 
exemplified by Smith v. Doe,220 holds that specific constituent aspects of 
that status—individual collateral consequences—are not punishment.  
Therefore restrictions supported by minimal rationality may be im-
posed retroactively and without notice.  Another line of cases, repre-
sented by Trop v. Dulles221 and Padilla v. Kentucky,222 holds that systematic 
destruction of legal status is punishment, or at least of constitutional 
significance, and that the criminal justice system should be structured 
to ensure that convictions are imposed fairly, in part because they al-
low the imposition of collateral consequences. 
The tension between these cases can be resolved by understanding 
the critical impact of a conviction to be the change in legal status.  A 
person with a clean record is free and equal.  However, after convic-
tion, even years after satisfaction of the sentence, the law regards a 
 
220 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
221 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
222 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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person with a record as an appropriate subject for restrictive regula-
tion.  The essential nature of the legal disadvantage is not disenfran-
chisement, for example, or ineligibility for a particular license.  Those 
disabilities change across time and geography.  What does not change 
is that the convicted person is subject to whatever regulation legisla-
tures deem merited.  Similarly, a lawyer or judge candidly advising an 
individual about her status might not be able to warn her of each specif-
ic disadvantage she will suffer, but can and should make clear that in 
general civil rights, employment opportunities, and other aspects of sta-
tus in society will, or may be, limited or reduced.  This is a momentous 
punishment, and our law has not sufficiently accounted for it. 
